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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS





               Appellant,
   v.
COMMISSIONER OF  SOCIAL SECURITY,
              Appellee.
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 07-cv-00395)
District Judge: Honorable David Stewart Cercone
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 2, 2008
Before: FISHER, CHAGARES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 8, 2008)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
2Rick Elliott appeals a judgment of the District Court affirming the decision of an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denying his claim for Social Security Disability
Benefits.  We will affirm.
As we write exclusively for the parties, who are well acquainted with the facts and
procedural history of the case, we will turn directly to the sole issue on appeal.  Elliott
claims that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence because it limited
him to working less than eight hours per day.  In support of this claim, Elliott cites page
21 of the record, where the ALJ wrote the following:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds the claimant retains the
residual functional capacity to perform the exertional demands of light
work, with certain modifications.  Under light work restrictions, he cannot
lift more than twenty pounds, and can customarily not sit more than two of
eight hours a workday (20 CFR 404.1567 and Social Security Rulings 83-
10, 96-8p).
From this statement, Elliott argues that “the ALJ’s explicit findings that Appellant cannot
sit more than two of eight hours and could occasionally walk and stand two (or four)
hours out of an eight hour work [sic] are a de facto restriction to part-time light work.” 
Although we agree that Elliott’s conclusion necessarily follows from his premise, we find
that his premise is flawed.
The ALJ did not explicitly find that Elliott cannot sit for more than two of eight
hours.  A complete review of the decision demonstrates that the ALJ found that Elliott
possessed the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work – with various
restrictions – for an eight hour day.  For example, in Finding 6, the ALJ wrote:  “The
3claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform the exertional demands of light
work, with certain modifications.  The claimant is limited to occasional walking and
standing, two hours out of an eight hour workday. . . .  The claimant must be afforded the
option to sit and stand during the work day.”   As Finding 6 makes plain, the ALJ held
that Elliott had the RFC to work a full eight-hour day, subject to modifications.
Elliott’s citation to page 21 of the record does not undermine our conclusion. 
There, the ALJ was simply noting the general definition of light work, as demonstrated by
his use of the word “customarily” and his citation to Social Security Ruling 83-10, which
states:  “the full range of light work requires standing or walking, off and on, for a total of
approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday.”  The ALJ’s observation that the full range
of light work requires standing or walking for six hours per day is consistent with his
conclusion that Elliott possessed the RFC to perform light work with modifications, i.e.,
that he not be required to stand or walk for more than two hours per day, and that he have
a sit/stand option for the remainder of the eight-hour workday.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
